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How to evaluate LLMs before production

Evaluating LLMs before production is challenging due to real inputs being ambiguous, labels being inconsistent, and important context being missing or truncated. The evaluation set may not reflect the production distribution, and edge cases that rarely appear in benchmark…

By Mariko Wakabayashi & Zixiao Chen·Aug 25·github.blog·3 min read

Intelligence analysis by Llama

How to evaluate LLMs before production
Image: github.blog

To evaluate LLMs before production, teams should start with the product decision, not the model, and treat offline evaluation like integration testing. This involves defining the decision the evaluation is meant to support, selecting the configuration that achieves the strongest false-positive reduction while satisfying the recall requirement and meeting operational guardrails, and or…

Why it matters

Evaluating LLMs before production is crucial to ensure that the system can reduce false positives while preserving enough recall to be safe in a production security workflow.

Imagine you have a machine that can help find secrets in code. But sometimes it finds things that aren't really secrets. To make sure it's working well, you need to test it with real code and see how it does. You also need to make sure it's not missing any important information or making mistakes that could be bad. It's like testing a new tool to make sure it's safe and useful.

Analysis

Defining the Product Decision, Not the Model

When an LLM system doesn’t perform as expected, the first instinct is often to adjust its technical components. Teams may rewrite the prompt, add context, introduce another reasoning step, adjust the surrounding pipeline, or switch models. Before making any of these changes, they should define the decision the evaluation is meant to support.

For our secret-scanning work, we asked: Can the system reduce false positives while preserving enough recall to be safe in a production security workflow? To answer this question, teams must decide which mistakes are acceptable, which metrics should drive the product decision, and which guardrails must remain within their defined thresholds.

In secret scanning, incorrectly suppressing a real credential can be more consequential than asking a developer to review an additional alert. We therefore did not treat precision and recall as equally interchangeable metrics. Our primary objective was to reduce false positives and improve precision. Recall served as a safety constraint: an experiment could advance only if any decrease remained within a predefined acceptable range.

Treating Offline Evaluation Like Integration Testing

An LLM-based system continues to change after its first successful evaluation, so evaluation should not be a one-time exercise. Teams revise prompts, adopt new models, change how inputs and context are constructed, and refine the surrounding business logic. Any of these changes can improve the system, introduce a regression, or shift its behavior in an unexpected way.

For that reason, we treated offline evaluation similarly to an end-to-end integration test. We reran it whenever we made a meaningful change to the prompt, model, input construction, or broader system logic. The evaluation also needed to be repeatable enough that each new result could be compared against a known baseline.

Organizing Evaluation Criteria

We organized the evaluation criteria into three levels: primary outcome, safety constraint, and operational guardrails. This distinction prevented us from treating every metric as interchangeable. A change that reduced false positives but significantly lowered recall wasn’t automatically an improvement. Neither was a change that improved quality while making the system too slow, expensive, or difficult to integrate.

Consider two hypothetical experiment results:

Experiment Precision Recall Latency Decision Experiment A Large improvement Falls below the safety guardrail Acceptable Don’t advance Experiment B Moderate improvement Remains within the guardrail Acceptable Continue testing

Experiment A may look stronger if precision is viewed in isolation. Experiment B is more aligned with the product goal because it improves the developer experience without violating the recall guardrail.

Conclusion

Evaluating LLMs before production is a challenging task. By defining the product decision, not the model, and treating offline evaluation like integration testing, teams can ensure that their LLM-based system is safe and effective in a production environment.

Key points

  • Evaluating LLMs before production is challenging due to real inputs being ambiguous, labels being inconsistent, and important context being missing or truncated.
  • Teams should start with the product decision, not the model, and treat offline evaluation like integration testing.
  • The evaluation criteria should be organized into primary outcome, safety constraint, and operational guardrails.
  • A change that reduces false positives but significantly lowers recall is not automatically an improvement.
  • Evaluating LLMs before production is crucial to ensure that the system can reduce false positives while preserving enough recall to be safe in a production security workflow.
The Upside

If this development plays out positively, it could lead to more accurate and reliable LLM-based systems in production. This could improve the overall quality of code analysis, developer tools, and security workflows.

The Downside

However, there are also potential risks and challenges associated with this development. For example, if the system is not properly evaluated or tested, it could lead to inaccurate or misleading results. This could have negative consequences for developers and security teams.

Originally reported at

github.blog

Discernion covers the story. Read the full piece at the source.

Tagsai-agentscodinggithubllmsopen-sourcesecurity

Author

Mariko Wakabayashi & Zixiao Chen

Intelligence analysis by

Llama

Published

Aug 25, 2026

Source

github.blog

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Topics

ai-agentscodinggithubllmsopen-sourcesecurity

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