War in Sudan: What Defecting Paramilitaries Claim
High-ranking officers and political figures are defecting from Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to join the regular army, providing insights into the paramilitary group's internal dynamics and external support.
Intelligence analysis by Gemini 2.5 Flash
A wave of defections from the RSF, including prominent generals and political advisors, is offering a rare glimpse into the paramilitary's structure, leadership struggles, and alleged foreign backing. These former RSF members claim their leader, Hemedti, is wounded and isolated, with external actors now dictating the group's strategy.
Imagine two big teams fighting in Sudan. Some players from one team, called the RSF, are now leaving and joining the other team, the regular army. These players are telling secrets about their old team, like how their leader might be hurt and not really in charge anymore, and how other countries might be telling them what to do. This is a big deal because it could change how the game is played and who wins.
Analysis
The ongoing conflict in Sudan has seen a notable shift with a series of high-profile defections from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to the Sudanese army. These departures, which began in early 2026, include not only field commanders but also members of the RSF's political wing, such as Fares al-Nur, a former advisor to the RSF commander and member of their parallel government. The article highlights that these defectors, while potentially seeking to prove their loyalty to their new allegiance, offer valuable, albeit contextualized, information regarding the RSF's internal workings and external connections.
Moussa Khamsine
Major General Moussa Ali Ahmad, known as Moussa Khamsine, is one of the most recent and significant defectors, having joined the government camp on August 20 with over 315 men and 50 armed vehicles. Khamsine, who previously fought the regular army in North Darfur, cited disappointment with the RSF's ambition to establish a 'new state' as his primary reason for leaving. His defection was facilitated by Major General al-Nour al-Qobba, another prominent RSF deserter who switched sides in April. These high-level defections suggest a growing disillusionment within the RSF's ranks, extending beyond individual fighters to seasoned commanders and political strategists.
Hemedti's Isolation
Colonel Ali Rizkallah, known as al-Savana, a defector who joined the army in May with 5,000 fighters, has been particularly vocal about the state of RSF leader General Mohamad Hamdane Dogolo, or Hemedti. Al-Savana claims Hemedti was severely wounded early in the war, is now depressed and isolated, and no longer holds effective command. He alleges that Hemedti, who reportedly travels between Nyala, the UAE, and Kenya, confessed that 'the decisions of the RSF are now in the hands of external actors.' This suggests a significant erosion of Hemedti's authority, with external forces potentially dictating the RSF's strategic direction, including a purported shift towards detaching Darfur and Kordofan from Sudan.
Abou Dhabi's Influence
The defectors' testimonies also shed light on the alleged regional connections and external support for the RSF. Colonel al-Savana specifically identifies Mohamed Abdel-Rahmane Hasabu, the former second vice-president of the RSF, as the principal coordinator between the RSF and Abu Dhabi, which is portrayed as the main supporter of the paramilitary group. Hasabu, an influential figure from South Darfur with ties to the former al-Bashir regime, is described as the Sudanese closest to Abu Dhabi in recent months. Furthermore, al-Savana claims that dissent within the RSF is met with severe consequences, with cadres who criticized the paramilitaries' functioning allegedly being eliminated, underscoring a climate of fear and control within the organization.
Key points
- Several high-ranking RSF officers and political figures have defected to the Sudanese army since early 2026.
- Defectors, including General Moussa Khamsine, cite disillusionment with the RSF's goals and internal dynamics.
- Colonel al-Savana claims RSF leader Hemedti is wounded, isolated, and no longer in command, with external actors making decisions.
- Mohamed Abdel-Rahmane Hasabu is identified as the key coordinator between the RSF and Abu Dhabi, its alleged main supporter.
- Dissent within the RSF is reportedly met with severe consequences, including the elimination of critical cadres.
Should these defections continue and the revelations prove accurate, the RSF's internal cohesion and operational capacity could significantly weaken. This might lead to a faster resolution of the conflict, potentially paving the way for more effective peace negotiations and a reduction in civilian suffering across Sudan.
The defections, while notable, might be limited in scope and not fundamentally alter the RSF's overall strength or resolve. Furthermore, the claims of external influence could escalate regional tensions, drawing more foreign actors into the conflict and prolonging the instability in Sudan.