Challenges facing Mecca Joint Defense Agreement

Different Security Threats

The biggest problem with the Mecca Agreement is that the security threats of the three members are not the same. Saudi Arabia sees an important part of its security concerns as Iran, Ansarullah of Yemen, and armed groups close to Tehran, while Pakistan is primarily faced with the issue of India, the security of its eastern borders, and the conflicts related to Kashmir. Turkey also has different security priorities and devotes a significant part of its military and political power to developments in Syria, Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean and border security issues. Therefore, it is unclear to what extent the “attack one, attack all” commitment will be practical in the face of all these crises.

This difference in threats can become problematic when one member is involved in a conflict that, from the perspective of the other two members, is not directly related to their national security. In such circumstances, the political commitment on paper may diverge from the real calculations of the governments and the collective response may become a limited, symbolic or even purely political response.

Ambiguity in the Concept of Collective Defense

The second challenge concerns the most important part of the agreement: when will an attack be subject to collective defense? In today’s region, threats do not only occur through direct attacks by one country’s army on another. Attacks by armed groups, missile and drone operations, cyber attacks and indirect actions constitute an important part of the conflicts in the region. If the agreement only considers a direct attack by a state to be subject to a defense obligation, a significant part of the real threats to the region will remain outside its framework. But if every attack by an armed group also automatically means the activation of a joint defense, the agreement members may be unintentionally caught in a series of regional conflicts that do not necessarily correspond to the interests of all of them.

Challenge of Translating Political Commitment to Using Military Capabilities

A defense pact is deterrent when the other party believes that its members are willing to implement their commitments in real conditions. But there is a long gap between signing the agreement and creating a real defense structure. Sustainable deterrence requires specific mechanisms for information exchange, operational coordination, command, joint planning and decision-making in crisis situations. In the absence of such mechanisms, the Mecca agreement may become more of a political commitment than a real military alliance. The existence of powerful armies alone does not mean the ability to wage joint war. Differences in equipment, military doctrine, command structure, and strategic priorities can also make coordination between the three countries difficult.

The Challenge of the Relationship with the United States: Independence or Diversification?

One of the unstated and important goals of such arrangements is to reduce the dependence of the countries of the region on the American security umbrella; but here a fundamental contradiction arises. Turkey is a member of NATO, Pakistan has a long history of military cooperation with the United States, and Saudi Arabia continues to depend on American equipment, training, and defense cooperation. Therefore, the Mecca agreement cannot yet be seen as a sign of the region’s exit from the US-led security system. In fact, this agreement can at best diversify the security resources of the member countries. But if this structure is to operate without a real reduction in military and political dependence on the West, its security independence will be limited. In other words, the fundamental question is whether the member countries are truly building an independent security architecture or are they merely creating a new layer alongside the US security mechanism.

A More Important Challenge: Does this Agreement have the Capacity to Manage Crises?

Defense agreements are usually signed in times of easy calm; their real test comes when one of the members is involved in a war. If Saudi Arabia faces a major attack in the future, will Turkey and Pakistan be willing to come for help militarily? If Turkey is involved in a crisis on its borders, will Saudi Arabia and Pakistan be willing to intervene directly? And if Pakistan faces a major crisis with India, will the other two members be willing to engage in a costly confrontation to fulfill the agreement’s obligations? The answers to these questions are still unclear, and this uncertainty is a significant challenge to the success of the Mecca agreement.