How has Iran defeated the pressure equation?

A $60B Vote of Confidence

Iran's ability to resist US pressure and redefining the equation in its favor is a testament to the country's unique power structure and decision-making process. The US strategy of increasing pressure and escalating the confrontation with Iran has reached a deadlock, with US intelligence agencies believing that military strikes will not change Tehran's behavior or strategic positions. This assessment is significant because it comes from the very institutions that are tasked with measuring the effectiveness of US security and military policies. The main question is why the strategy that America has repeatedly employed in different parts of the world has not achieved the desired results against Iran. The answer to this question must be sought in the essential difference between Iran and many countries that have previously been the target of US coercive policies. In political psychology theories, one of the most important factors in the success of external pressure is to create a sense of helplessness and psychological collapse in the target society. However, if society views the external threat not simply as a security crisis, but as an attack on its national identity and independence, the result will be exactly the opposite. In such circumstances, a phenomenon that political psychologists refer to as convergence against external threat is activated. The external threat largely marginalizes internal disputes, and society's main priority shifts to maintaining national security and preventing the enemy from succeeding. This is the same pattern that has been observed in many wars in history and is now visible in US intelligence assessments of Iran. On the other hand, Iran is not merely and simply a military actor that can be measured by classical power criteria. Iran's power structure is based on a set of hard and soft components; from military and missile capabilities to geopolitical depth, long experience in crisis management, rapid recovery capabilities and, most importantly, a high capacity to adapt to pressure conditions. For this reason, as the level of pressure increases, an important part of the country's latent capacities is also activated; a capacity that is usually less taken into account in the initial calculations of pressure planners. One of the major strategic errors of the United States is its linear view of the concept of power. In this view, it is assumed that by inflicting military or economic damage, the decision-making ability of the other party is reduced in the same proportion. However, in the case of Iran, the relationship between pressure and power is not necessarily linear. In many cases, external pressure has reproduced power rather than reducing it. The experience of four decades of sanctions, war, sabotage operations, and various types of security pressures has shown that Iran's decision-making structure has, over time, developed numerous mechanisms to adapt to critical situations. From the perspective of deterrence theories, the main goal of any military action is to change the calculations of the other side. If a military attack fails to create this change, then the goal of deterrence has not been achieved. The Washington Post report points to exactly this point; that the assessment of US intelligence agencies shows that military attacks have failed to change Iran's strategic behavior. This means that military means, contrary to initial expectations, have failed to create a new balance between the costs and benefits of Iran's decision-making. Another important point is the difference in the way Tehran and Washington view the concept of time. American politicians, especially in the electoral environment, usually seek quick and demonstrable achievements. For them, the success or failure of foreign policy is largely tied to the domestic election cycle. In contrast, strategic decision-making in Iran is usually based on long-term time horizons. This time difference means that the strategy of attrition gradually imposes greater costs on American decision-makers than it does on Iran. The other side of the story is American public opinion, which is increasingly turning against the war. As the costs of the war continue to rise, the American public is becoming increasingly skeptical of the war's justification and the benefits it is supposed to bring. This skepticism is a major challenge for the Trump administration, which is struggling to maintain public support for the war. The administration's efforts to frame the war as a necessary measure to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons have failed to convince the American public. As a result, the administration is facing growing opposition from lawmakers and the public, which is making it increasingly difficult to maintain public support for the war. In conclusion, the story of Iran's defeat of the US pressure equation is a complex and multifaceted one. It involves a combination of factors, including Iran's unique power structure, its ability to adapt to pressure, and the differences in the way Tehran and Washington view the concept of time. The story also highlights the limitations of US military means in changing Iran's behavior and the importance of understanding Iran's decision-making process. As the war continues, it is likely that we will see more of these complexities and nuances emerge, and it is essential that we continue to analyze and understand them in order to make informed decisions about the war.