Pakistan can learn from Indonesia's zero-terrorist attack milestone: Expert
An Indonesian counter-extremism expert told a CAPES audience in Islamabad that Pakistan can draw lessons from Indonesia's four-step whole-of-society approach, which has kept terrorist attacks at zero annually since the Bali bombings of 2002.
Intelligence analysis by Llama
Visiting RSIS fellow Dr. Noor Huda Ismail told a CAPES lecture in Islamabad that Indonesia's experience shows countering violent extremism works best as a layered, community-driven project, not a security-only campaign. He framed radicalization as relational and urged Pakistan to study the Indonesian model.
Imagine two kids in a schoolyard, and one lonely kid gets pulled into a rough group because it makes them feel important. Indonesia figured out that catching bad guys isn't enough, you also have to help lonely kids find better friends and a better purpose. Pakistan is being told it can copy that idea to keep kids out of dangerous groups too.
Analysis
The Bali bombings of 2002 as Indonesia's turning point
President of CAPES Dr. Khuram Iqbal opened the lecture by anchoring Indonesia's story in a single year: 2002, the year of the Bali bombings. The framing matters because the expert panel did not present Indonesia as a country that simply avoided extremism, but as one that absorbed a catastrophic attack and then rebuilt its counter-extremism architecture around it. The post-Bali period is what gave rise to the policy continuity that CAPES now holds up as a model for Pakistan. For Pakistani audiences, the implication is that the relevant comparison is not abstract counter-terror doctrine, but the political and institutional work required to sustain a multi-decade shift in approach.
Dr. Noor Huda Ismail's four-step whole-of-society model
Dr. Noor Huda Ismail, a Visiting Fellow at RSIS Singapore and founder of the Institute for International Peace Building, walked the audience through the layering that he argues made Indonesia's record possible. He described a gradual move through counterterrorism, then deradicalization, then prevention, and finally community resilience. The order is significant: each step widens the circle of actors beyond the security services. Dr. Ismail's argument is that extremists exploit identity, networks, grievances, and opportunity gaps, so any response that stops at the first step leaves those gaps open. For Pakistan, which has historically led with hard security operations, the model essentially asks the state to treat resilience-building as a frontline tool rather than an afterthought.
Jemaah Islamiyah and the human logic of recruitment
The lecture's most concrete material came from Dr. Ismail's own work with former members of Jemaah Islamiyah, the Southeast Asian network linked to al-Qaeda. His core claim is that radicalization is relational before it is ideological: people are pulled in by recognition, belonging, purpose, or material incentives, not by handed-down doctrine. He also pushed back on the common reflex to blame the internet, arguing that online platforms did not invent radicalization but changed its speed, scale, and recruitment architecture. For Pakistani policymakers, the takeaway is that deradicalization programs that ignore the social bonds and grievances driving recruitment are unlikely to outlast the individuals they target.
Key points
- Indonesian expert Dr. Noor Huda Ismail told a CAPES lecture in Islamabad that Pakistan can learn from Indonesia's whole-of-society counter-extremism model.
- Indonesia has recorded zero terrorist attacks annually since the Bali bombings of 2002, according to CAPES president Dr. Khuram Iqbal.
- Ismail outlined a four-step Indonesian approach: counterterrorism, deradicalization, prevention, and community resilience.
- Drawing on work with former Jemaah Islamiyah members, Ismail argued that radicalization is relational before it is ideological, driven by belonging, recognition, and grievance.
- The lecture was organized by the Consortium for Asia Pacific and Eurasian Studies (CAPES) and drew on Ismail's affiliation with RSIS Singapore.
If Pakistan's CVE community absorbs the Indonesian playbook, it could shift counter-extremism spending from kinetic operations toward prevention and community resilience, potentially reducing the flow of new recruits over time. A more relational approach to deradicalization, as practiced in Indonesia, may also produce better reintegration outcomes for those who do leave militant networks.
Indonesia's success was built against the specific threat profile of Jemaah Islamiyah, and Pakistan faces a more fragmented landscape of groups, including TTP affiliates and sectarian outfits, which may not respond to the same mix of interventions. The risk is that adopting the label of a whole-of-society approach without the underlying institutional continuity that CAPES credits for Indonesia's record produces policy theater rather than measurable change.
